An American Lion

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The Frisky Mole Boy of Groton

Norman Rogers recounts the summer he spent hiding from the stern love of his father and living as the world-famous “frisky mole boy” in the Groton, Connecticut sewer system. The Frisky Mole Boy of Groton seduced the women of the town and solved crimes, all while subsisting on a steady diet of depravity and confusion.

Rampage of the Innocents is my unfinished but brilliant Historical Romance Novel (now, with more sex and violence for my teenaged readers)

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    An American Lion
    « Norman Buys a Box of Kleenex | Main | A Track Suit on a Plane? What Are You? In the Mafia? »
    Tuesday
    Nov102009

    The Security Situation in Afghanistan is in Freefall

    Did you know it was getting this bad? The Government Accountability Office warns us that the security situation in Afghanistan is getting worse each day [pdf alert]:

    Developing a self-reliant Afghanistan is a key end-state goal articulated in the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan, which notes that achieving such an outcome will enable the United States to withdraw combat forces and make a sustained commitment to Afghan political and economic development. While U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan have made some progress, the deterioration of security has impeded efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. In particular, U.S. officials have cited poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering management and oversight of such efforts.

    For instance, the administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has identified the need for more security in order for civilian personnel and contractors to do their work in Afghanistan. Similarly, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. forces in Afghanistan testified in his June 2009 confirmation hearing that improving security was a prerequisite for the development of local governance and economic growth in Afghanistan. The following list provides some specific examples of how the security situation in Afghanistan hampers U.S. efforts:

    •Development programs delayed or abandoned.

    U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) staff in Afghanistan cited security as a major challenge to implementing development projects. According to USAID, programs ranging from road reconstruction to power generation and agricultural development face significant cost increases and have been delayed or abandoned due to a lack of security. For example, because attacks prevented contractors from working on an Afghan road to the Kajaki dam, USAID terminated the road contract after it had spent about $5 million on it. USAID further noted in its comments on this report that supplies for the Kajaki dam project must now be flown in due to the deteriorating security environment. Additionally, DOD has reported that, although progress has been made in completing construction of the “ring road”—Afghanistan’s major highway—a lack of security has increased the risk of using Afghan roads.

    •Disruption of supply lines.

    Supply transportation operations in Afghanistan continue to depend on treacherous overland routes. Although sensitive equipment is flown in by plane, supply convoys moving overland from Pakistan have been subject to repeated threats and attacks.

    •Development of Afghan security forces impeded by security problems.

    U.S. officials have reported that efforts to train ANSF have been hindered by security problems. For example, despite the fact that the Afghan National Army is charged with defeating the insurgency and terrorism, Afghan National Police are often reassigned from their training courses to provide immediate assistance with the counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of their training. Additionally, DOD officials have indicated that distributing equipment to police in the field has been challenged in part by the unstable security situation.

    •Counternarcotics operations challenged by insurgent activity.

    About 98 percent of Afghanistan’s opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in the southern provinces where insurgent activity has been heaviest. Recognizing the nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency, in December 2008 DOD adopted policies that allow the U.S. military to increase its involvement in counternarcotics operations.

    •Oversight of ongoing programs restricted.

    Afghanistan’s security situation has contributed to U.S. funds being expended with limited U.S. government oversight. For example, USAID officials told us their ability to monitor and evaluate ongoing programs has been restricted by security constraints. In comments on this report, USAID noted that due to deteriorating security in southern and eastern Afghanistan, monitoring of the delivery of health services has been significantly hindered or stopped in some areas. Similarly, State officials told us that poor security has considerably inhibited the oversight of counternarcotics efforts outside Kabul, including programs such as opium eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public information.

    Bear in mind, this report has likely been overtaken by events. The security situation in Afghanistan may improve as winter approaches and shuts down insurgent movement and activity. What is needed is a political solution, not a military solution. Pouring more troops into Afghanistan for a spring offensive is going to be a popular option in the weeks and months ahead. The problem is, where do you get the troops? What do you do when the enemy reacts accordingly and doesn’t fight conventional battles and goes to ground?

    Here’s a look, by the way, at where your money has gone in Afghanistan:

    How effective has the expenditure been up to this point? The answer is, not very. But it’s not just money that isn’t working—it’s the opinion of USAID that the security situation has caused their efforts to fall behind as well:

     Given that the GAO can’t keep up with the events as they evolve, how can anyone be confident that the policymakers have timely information and can make informed decisions?

    I cannot be confident of that after reading a GAO report ending with August data here near the middle of November.

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