
In this war on terror I keep hearing about, the killing of our enemies becomes the subject of some debate. Should we kill our enemies? Absolutely. Should we do it by remote control? Fine by me. But should we kill indiscriminately after the enemy has penetrated our defenses and killed some of ours? Should the killing we do be designed to advance our strategic objectives or should it be a free for all where we are killing just to be killing?
I think we’re headed down a slippery slope here:
Since the suicide bombing that took the lives of seven Americans in Afghanistan on Dec. 30, the Central Intelligence Agency has struck back against militants in Pakistan with the most intensive series of missile strikes from drone aircraft since the covert program began.
Beginning the day after the attack on a C.I.A. base in Khost, Afghanistan, the agency has carried out 11 strikes that have killed about 90 people suspected of being militants, according to Pakistani news reports, which make almost no mention of civilian casualties. The assault has included strikes on a mud fortress in North Waziristan on Jan. 6 that killed 17 people and a volley of missiles on a compound in South Waziristan last Sunday that killed at least 20.
“For the C.I.A., there is certainly an element of wanting to show that they can hit back,” said Bill Roggio, editor of The Long War Journal, an online publication that tracks the C.I.A.’s drone campaign. Mr. Roggio, as well as Pakistani and American intelligence officials, said many of the recent strikes had focused on the Pakistani Taliban and its leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, who claimed responsibility for the Khost bombing.
I’m not sure why they feel the need to hit back—they’ve been hitting the enemy hard since early last year:
With two missile strikes over the past week, the Obama administration has expanded the covert war run by the Central Intelligence Agency inside Pakistan, attacking a militant network seeking to topple the Pakistani government.
The missile strikes on training camps run by Baitullah Mehsud represent a broadening of the American campaign inside Pakistan, which has been largely carried out by drone aircraft. Under President Bush, the United States frequently attacked militants from Al Qaeda and the Talibaninvolved in cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, but had stopped short of raids aimed at Mr. Mehsud and his followers, who have played less of a direct role in attacks on American troops.
The strikes are another sign that President Obamais continuing, and in some cases extending, Bush administration policy in using American spy agencies against terrorism suspects in Pakistan, as he had promised to do during his presidential campaign. At the same time, Mr. Obama has begun to scale back some of the Bush policies on the detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects, which he has criticized as counterproductive.
Mr. Mehsud was identified early last year by both American and Pakistani officials as the man who had orchestrated the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister and the wife of Pakistan’s current president, Asif Ali Zardari. Mr. Bush included Mr. Mehsud’s name in a classified list of militant leaders whom the C.I.A. and American commandos were authorized to capture or kill.
It is unclear why the Obama administration decided to carry out the attacks, which American and Pakistani officials said occurred last Saturday and again on Monday, hitting camps run by Mr. Mehsud’s network. The Saturday strike was aimed specifically at Mr. Mehsud, but he was not killed, according to Pakistani and American officials.
The Monday strike, officials say, was aimed at a camp run by Hakeem Ullah Mehsud, a top aide to the militant. By striking at the Mehsud network, the United States may be seeking to demonstrate to Mr. Zardari that the new administration is willing to go after the insurgents of greatest concern to the Pakistani leader.
It’s important to note that the attack carried out against the CIA operatives was in response to the escalation ordered by the President in February of 2009. If that policy had been successful, would we still see as many drone attacks as we are seeing nearly a year later? What has eleven months of stepped up attack by remote control delivered to us if we are now escalating even more than before our pattern of attacks?
If you’re fighting a war based on revenge, what legitimacy can you claim to be in it for noble reasons? Are we there to help the Afghans learn to defend themselves so we can leave? Are we there to keep Pakistan from unraveling? Do we have a strategic vision?
If you’re operating from a position of anger, revenge, and a need to show that we can “hit back,” what the hell good has the past year been for us in terms of getting closer to our objectives? By all means—kill the enemy. Don’t be surprised if they decide to react and push back. Don’t think for a second that a determined enemy won’t hit back. But at least have in place a strategic objective that allows you to see beyond single setbacks and incidents so that you can shape and control events, rather than just react to them.