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    Entries in Afghanistan (53)

    Sunday
    14Feb2010

    They're Destroying The City in Order to Save It, You See

    What a farce:

    Meanwhile, US, UK and Afghan forces have faced gun battles and numerous booby-traps on day two of the offensive in Marjah and Nad Ali in Helmand province.

    In Marjah, US Marine commander Brig Gen Larry Nicholson told Agence France-Presse his forces had “blown up a lot of IEDs” and come up against “a lot of sniper fire”.

    He said it could take up to 30 days to make the area safe.

    Marines were fired upon during a ceremony to raise the Afghan flag in Marjah.

    Another Marines spokesman, Lt Josh Diddams, told Associated Press US forces were in the “majority of the city”.

    “We’re starting to come across areas where the insurgents have actually taken up defensive positions. Initially it was more hit and run.”

    I am broken-hearted that so many good young men are being fed into what amounts to a meat grinder. I am sorry to have to tell you this, but this operation in Marjah is nothing akin to “Counterinsurgency” or COIN. It’s just another example of generals sending young men into areas of little or no strategic value in order to die. How does this operation advance the idea that we can defeat our enemy? How does this achieve our strategic goals? It kills a few hundred or more of an enemy that doesn’t care about numbers. It destroys homes, turns people against us, and shows us to be bloody fools.

    The enemy has the initiative; the Marines are being sent into areas littered with booby traps, saturated with ambush points, and are being forced to go house to house in order to try and separate innocent civilians from the enemy. This is a complete and utter waste of time. The enemy has no intention of “holding” Marjah; the enemy wants the Marines to pay for taking Marjah and will do whatever they can to fight another day.

    It’s no different than the fighting in Hue, during the Vietnam War. It’s a nightmare. Someone should relieve these generals now; our Marines deserve a better chance at kicking Taliban ass than this. This is a Napoleonic folly.

    Tuesday
    09Feb2010

    This is Exactly What I've Been Telling You

    Finally, someone else starts to get it:

    To be sure, unmanned drones are critical in the struggle against al Qaeda. They allow the United States to reach terrorists hiding in remote regions where it would be difficult for special operations forces to reach them, or to act on perishable intelligence when the only choice is to kill a terrorist or lose him. Constantly hovering Predator (or Reaper) drones also have a psychological effect on the enemy, forcing al Qaeda leaders to live in fear and spend time focusing on self-preservation that would otherwise be used planning the next attack. All this is for the good.

    The problem is that Obama is increasingly using drone strikes as a substitute for operations to bring terrorist leaders in alive for questioning — and that is putting the country at risk. As one high-ranking CIA official explained to me, in an interview for my book Courting Disaster, “In the wake of 9/11, [the CIA] put forward a program that had a lethal component to strike back at the people who did this. But the other component was to prevent this kind of catastrophe from happening again. And for that, killing people — especially killing senior al Qaeda leaders — is potentially counterproductive in that we can’t know or learn of future attacks. You can’t kill them all, and you don’t want to kill them all from an intelligence standpoint. We needed to know what they knew.”

    Once you buy into the notion that a “body count” is the preferable metric, all you will have to show for your efforts are dead men who will tell no tales. Oh, and innocents are killed as well, and that’s by the enemy’s design.

    Mr. Thiessen adds:

    In the years after the 9/11 attacks, the CIA worked with Pakistani and other intelligence services to hunt down senior terrorist leaders and take them in for interrogation. Among those captured were men like Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ammar al-Baluchi, Walid bin Attash, Riduan Isamuddin (aka “Hambali”), Bashir bin Lap, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and others. In all, about 100 terrorists were detained and questioned by the CIA. And the information they provided helped break up terrorist cells that were planning to blow up the U.S. Consulate in Karachi and the U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti; explode seven airplanes flying across the Atlantic from London to cities in North America; and fly hijacked airplanes into Heathrow Airport, London’s financial district, and the Library Tower in Los Angeles.

    Today, the Obama administration is no longer attempting to capture men like these alive; it is simply killing them. This may be satisfying, but it comes at a price. With every drone strike that vaporizes a senior al Qaeda leader, actionable intelligence is vaporized along with him. Dead terrorists can’t tell you their plans to strike America.

    They are killing because they can no longer interrogate. How’s that for a kick square in the nuts?

    What no one realizes is that, of course you can interrogate; you cannot torture. Interrogation takes work. Torture is the easy way out. And we cannot fight this war on the cheap and we cannot fight it the easy way.

    Friday
    05Feb2010

    Time to Relieve Some Officers

    Foward Operating Base Keating

    Inexcuseable:

    A delay of months in closing a remote combat outpost with “no tactical or strategic value” led to the deaths of eight U.S. soldiers last year in one of the worst battles of the Afghanistan war, a report found on Friday.

    The U.S. military’s report into a Taliban assault on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating in Nuristan province last October found the dozens of soldiers defending it fought with “conspicuous gallantry, courage and bravery under heavy enemy fire”.

    But it said commanders had already concluded months before that there was no purpose to holding the outpost. The base had already been scheduled to close in July or August, but the withdrawal was delayed for months because vehicles needed to remove gear from it were being used elsewhere.

    Hello, Friday newsdump.

    What can you say? A fundamental lack of strategic planning and no concept of the end state in Afghanistan leads you to keeping outposts open long after they are no longer needed.

    The officers who need relieving have stars on their shoulders, and more than two, at that.

    Saturday
    30Jan2010

    We Never Know Who Will Become an Instant Enemy

    This is yet another example of no knowing who is friend or foe:

    A NATO official says an Afghan interpreter killed two U.S. service members before he was killed himself at a combat outpost in eastern Afghanistan.

    The new details emerged Saturday, a day after the deaths were announced in a brief statement.

    The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to release the information, says the attack occurred in Wardak province.

    First reports indicated three Americans were killed but the official said one of the dead was an Afghan.

    It wasn’t immediately clear why the interpreter opened fire.

    Unless we deal with the money issue—what we pay the people who help us, what the Afghan government pays its forces, and the money that comes from the sale of heroin on the world market—we will never have a handle on who the enemy is on any given day. In some cases, pure fanaticism might explain a sudden change of allegiance. But, you cannot deny the allure of money to a suicide attacker.

    Thursday
    28Jan2010

    Are You Ready to Work With the Taliban?

    I don’t know how this is going to play in the United States, but we’re going to be getting in bed with the Taliban sooner rather than later. This is a redux of embracing the Sunnis in Iraq in order to get them to stop blowing up our military vehicles. This is the Petraeusification of Afghanistan, which in my definition is to pay your enemies to stop fighting you and then dishonestly claim that a “surge” of troops made it happen. You can then go on to accept accolades for your brilliant strategies; no one is paying attention anyway, and they don’t bother publishing anything Michael O’Hanlon has to say anymore.

    In what is a hilarious aside, O’Hanlon’s last published editorial dates to October 6, 2009, which seems like a lifetime ago. And even that was a sop thrown to him by the Washington Post. My source on that is a simple Google search, so there might be something more recent. But, who cares?

    In other words, working with the Taliban is a foregone conclusion:

    Afghan President Hamid Karzai has told the BBC he plans to introduce a scheme to attract Taliban fighters back to normal life by offering money and jobs.

    He would offer to pay and resettle Taliban fighters to come over to his side, with the scheme funded by the international community.

    He said the UK and US would show at a conference next week in London that they had decided to back his new plan.

    Japan is one of the countries which, he said, is prepared to put up the money.

    The Taliban currently pay their volunteers, who are often just farmers, significantly more than the Afghan government can afford to give its forces.

    Are we trying to destroy them? Are we accepting of a reality where we have to work with them now? What does that mean for women’s rights in Afghanistan?

    All of the posturing we have been treated to has been for nothing. Embracing the Taliban means very little at the local level in Afghanistan but it would have huge implications for the United States if someone happened to be paying attention. It’s nothing short of deciding in 1968 to work with the Viet Cong, in other words, and the only difference here is that there’s no one paying attention. They just want the thing over. If you wanted to highlight one reason why Afghanistan is not Vietnam, look no further than the fact that there is no viable peace movement in this country; look no further than the fact that no one cares, except for the soldiers and their families.

    Pardon me while I run out and see what O’Hanlon has to say about this.

    Saturday
    23Jan2010

    Killing is an Instrument of Statecraft, Not Revenge

    In this war on terror I keep hearing about, the killing of our enemies becomes the subject of some debate. Should we kill our enemies? Absolutely. Should we do it by remote control? Fine by me. But should we kill indiscriminately after the enemy has penetrated our defenses and killed some of ours? Should the killing we do be designed to advance our strategic objectives or should it be a free for all where we are killing just to be killing?

    I think we’re headed down a slippery slope here:

    Since the suicide bombing that took the lives of seven Americans in Afghanistan on Dec. 30, the Central Intelligence Agency has struck back against militants in Pakistan with the most intensive series of missile strikes from drone aircraft since the covert program began.

    Beginning the day after the attack on a C.I.A. base in Khost, Afghanistan, the agency has carried out 11 strikes that have killed about 90 people suspected of being militants, according to Pakistani news reports, which make almost no mention of civilian casualties. The assault has included strikes on a mud fortress in North Waziristan on Jan. 6 that killed 17 people and a volley of missiles on a compound in South Waziristan last Sunday that killed at least 20.

    “For the C.I.A., there is certainly an element of wanting to show that they can hit back,” said Bill Roggio, editor of The Long War Journal, an online publication that tracks the C.I.A.’s drone campaign. Mr. Roggio, as well as Pakistani and American intelligence officials, said many of the recent strikes had focused on the Pakistani Taliban and its leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, who claimed responsibility for the Khost bombing.

    I’m not sure why they feel the need to hit back—they’ve been hitting the enemy hard since early last year:

    With two missile strikes over the past week, the Obama administration has expanded the covert war run by the Central Intelligence Agency inside Pakistan, attacking a militant network seeking to topple the Pakistani government.

    The missile strikes on training camps run by Baitullah Mehsud represent a broadening of the American campaign inside Pakistan, which has been largely carried out by drone aircraft. Under President Bush, the United States frequently attacked militants from Al Qaeda and the Talibaninvolved in cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, but had stopped short of raids aimed at Mr. Mehsud and his followers, who have played less of a direct role in attacks on American troops.

    The strikes are another sign that President Obamais continuing, and in some cases extending, Bush administration policy in using American spy agencies against terrorism suspects in Pakistan, as he had promised to do during his presidential campaign. At the same time, Mr. Obama has begun to scale back some of the Bush policies on the detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects, which he has criticized as counterproductive.

    Mr. Mehsud was identified early last year by both American and Pakistani officials as the man who had orchestrated the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister and the wife of Pakistan’s current president, Asif Ali Zardari. Mr. Bush included Mr. Mehsud’s name in a classified list of militant leaders whom the C.I.A. and American commandos were authorized to capture or kill.

    It is unclear why the Obama administration decided to carry out the attacks, which American and Pakistani officials said occurred last Saturday and again on Monday, hitting camps run by Mr. Mehsud’s network. The Saturday strike was aimed specifically at Mr. Mehsud, but he was not killed, according to Pakistani and American officials.

    The Monday strike, officials say, was aimed at a camp run by Hakeem Ullah Mehsud, a top aide to the militant. By striking at the Mehsud network, the United States may be seeking to demonstrate to Mr. Zardari that the new administration is willing to go after the insurgents of greatest concern to the Pakistani leader.

    It’s important to note that the attack carried out against the CIA operatives was in response to the escalation ordered by the President in February of 2009. If that policy had been successful, would we still see as many drone attacks as we are seeing nearly a year later? What has eleven months of stepped up attack by remote control delivered to us if we are now escalating even more than before our pattern of attacks?

    If you’re fighting a war based on revenge, what legitimacy can you claim to be in it for noble reasons? Are we there to help the Afghans learn to defend themselves so we can leave? Are we there to keep Pakistan from unraveling? Do we have a strategic vision?

    If you’re operating from a position of anger, revenge, and a need to show that we can “hit back,” what the hell good has the past year been for us in terms of getting closer to our objectives? By all means—kill the enemy. Don’t be surprised if they decide to react and push back. Don’t think for a second that a determined enemy won’t hit back. But at least have in place a strategic objective that allows you to see beyond single setbacks and incidents so that you can shape and control events, rather than just react to them.