An American Lion

Mount Vernon

It's sad when phony scholarship is allowed to run amok. Usually, I don't pay attention to the rantings and ravings of people with clear agendas--you know, the people who want to prove that they're smart by coming up with some new way to slice and dice the reputation of a man who can no longer defend himself.

John Ferling tries to paint George Washington as being more "human" by trying to selectively tear down his reputation. I'm certain that Ferling is wrong in his thesis, which seems to be that he is the first person to notice that George Washington was a horrible, terrible beast of a vicious man. The fact of the matter is, Washington was a complexbut noble man with flaws like any other man of his time. I say this because you cannot hew to the myth without acknowledging the flaws of the men who founded this country. Their flaws are real, but if we view them through current times, we risk a distorted view of who they really were. I say that this is phony scholarship--you can't judge a man of 1754 by today's standards when it comes to his political orethical behavior. You cancertainly call him any number of awful things, but bear in mind that his conduct was not original nor was it enough to have him rendered an outcast in his day. If not for the hard-assed General Washington, who kept the Continental Army in existence through sheer force of will, this would not be the United States, period. Viewed as if he were alive today, Washington would join Bobby Knight in infamy.

Ferling, as reviewed in the Washington Post, says:

"Much of the aura that surrounded Washington in life and death," writes Ferling -- his air of military brilliance, his wariness of power, his stoical nonpartisanship -- "was mythological."

Hardly. Myths were punctured early and often in those days. A young man of modest standing such as Washington would have been easily dismissed during the French and Indian War. Instead, I will refute Ferling's grandstanding agenda-driven bullshit with this lengthy excerpt:

Major Washington began his journey on October 3, 1753; and though beset with the greatest difficulties, extreme hardships, and actual endangerment of life, he completed this mission January 16, 1754, when he brought to Governor Dinwiddie the important reply and his own report with a map. This report which, although hastily written in a few hours from his daily journal, demonstrated George Washington's ability clearly and forcefully to express his thoughts in writing, the governor had it printed immediately, and it helped to arouse the Colonies and British Government to the importance and difficulties of the problem.

Pending Washington's report, preparations had already been begun by the Ohio Company to build a fort at the junction of the Allegheny and the Monongahela Rivers, and to complete and defend this a regiment of Virginia volunteers was ordered recruited. Washington was commissioned on March 15, 1754, lieutenant colonel as second in command under Colonel Joshua Fry with the main body of the regiment later. But before the small detachment got over the mountains the French ejected the little group of about 40 engaged upon the fort, took possession, and renamed it Fort Duquesne.

Washington continued his march and held parleys with the Indians. On May 28 he attacked and captured a reconnoitering French force, and in doing so started the French and Indian War. Not succeeding in attaching the Indians to the English side and finding his advanced position otherwise untenable, he started to retire, but on July 3 surrendered to the French his hastily constructed works, called Fort Necessity. He had put up a valiant fight and was permitted to continue his march back to the Potomac. This was the only time he ever surrendered.

The news of this skirmish aroused both French and English to the immanence of conflict between them. However chagrined Colonel Washington may have felt over his first baptism of war, his position was so entirely all that could be expected that he received the thanks of the House of Burgesses.

If Washington was such a self-serving man created wholly out of myth at the time, why the thanks of his fellow Virginians? Was there something in his handling of the affair that they thought worthwhile and noble? It would seem to me that, if Ferling were right in any capacity, the career of George Washington would have ended, then and there, his myth dissipated by the reality of his actions. Instead, thanks were given and appreciation for his handling of the affair granted to him and his career continued to flourish.

The reviewer chortles and tries to make hay with this story, conveniently condensing almost 30 years of campaigning and leading into a few cheap lines:

But with his first taste of combat came his first mistake. Carrying out a stealth attack on a small band of Frenchmen who were moving through Virginia from Ohio, Washington ordered his men to fire. A Seneca tribe joined in the butchery. Even as it became obvious that the traveling group was a peaceful one, he made no effort to stop the carnage. When time came to report the error, he pinned the blame on his translator.

It wasn't the last time he would make a colleague the scapegoat. A few years later, he decided to take on a large force of enemy raiders threatening a British supply post, but in the haze of dusk he didn't realize he was ordering an attack on a fellow detachment. Forty were killed in the friendly fire. Not only did he blame the commander of the other troops, Washington "took the lion's share of the credit" for having stopped the slaughter. That tendency to shunt the blame did not wane as he matured into a soldier with greater responsibilities; it emerged again and again when he was commander in chief of the Continental Army. He made sure that, in spite of all mishap and missed opportunity, every victory from the Carolinas to Yorktown was seen as his personal triumph.

Hardly. In the book Empire of Fortune by Francis Jennings, it is clear from any reading that the incident was not Washington's finest hour, to be certain. But what is not in doubt is that

As it was, Villiers demands and receives a surrender of the “British” force in the fort. The surrender terms are written in French and contain the word “assassinat” in reference to Ensign Jumonville’s death. The translator for Washington is the same Jacob van Braam who had accompanied him to Fort le Boeuf. A version of the story is that van Braam gave a softer meaning to the word and that Washington had no intention of agreeing to an “assassination.”Captains Stobo and van Braam are taken hostage to be held awaiting the return of La Force and the others taken after the Jumonville Glen incident. Washington and his troops retreat back to Virginia.

Ferling also cannot answer to a comparison of what happened when an ambitious young Washington was given the opportunity to make a name for himself:

The next turn in the wheel of fate brought General Braddock to America at the head of 2,000 smart British Regulars. He was a gallant officer of distinguished record, but he was totally unfitted to cope with the Indian warfare, although convinced that he and the British Regulars would be impervious to any mishap, an opinion in which Washington and other colonists who were familiar with Indian warfare may not have agreed, in spite of the traditional respect for the professional.

Considerable, dissatisfaction had been aroused by the King's order that all provinicial commissions were inferior in rank to the royal ones. General Braddock, having heard of Colonel Washington's exploits, invited him to become a special aid "in his family, by which all inconvenience of that kind will be obviated." To this invitation Colonel Washington replied, acknowledging frankly --

"an inclination to serve the ensuing campaign as a volunteer; and this inclination is not a little increased, since it is likely to be conducted by a gentleman of the General's experience. but, besides this, and the laudable desire I may have to serve, with my best abilities, my King and country, I must be ingenous enough to confess, that I am not a little biassed by selfish considerations. To explain, Sir, I wish earnestly to attain some knowledge in the military profession, and, believing a more favorable opportunity cannot offer, than to serve under a gentleman of General Braddock's abilities and experience, it does, as may be reasonably suppose, not a little contribute to influence my choice."

A self-serving man would have leapt at the chance to throw in with General Braddock with no comment necessary.A vain or ambitious person might have puffed up their resume and spoke of a few exploits. Instead, Washington acknowledges his own clear ambitions and states that he wishes to learn the military as a profession. Telling a man of Braddock's rank that he, himself, was ambitious and wanted to learn more about the military strikes me as being honest and forthright. Here we have a young man telling a man of great importance of his desires and shortcomings, as plainly as the language of the time would have it.

Let us now turn to the words of Washington himself:

The catastrophe which followed, bringing to young Colonel Washington much bitter disillusionment and great responsibility, is best gathered from his letter to Governor Dinwiddie, giving his first account of the defeat of Braddock and his forces, July 9, 1755:

"We continue our March from Fort Cumberland to Frazier's (which is within 7 miles of Duquesne) without meeting any extraordinary event, having only a straggler or two picked up by the French Indians. When we came to this place, we were attacked (very unexpectedly) by about three hundred French and Indians. Our numbers consisted of about thirteen hundred well armed men, chiefly Regulars, who were immediately struck with such an inconceivable panick, that nothing byt confusion and disobedience of orders prevailed among them. The officers, in general, behaved with incomparable bravery, for which they greatly suffered, there being near 600 killed and wounded--a large proportion, out of the number we had! The Virginia companies behaved like men and died like soldiers; for I believe out of three companies that were on the ground that day scarce thirty were left alive. Capt. Payroney and all his officers, down to a corporal, were killed; Capt. Polson had almost as hard a fate, for only one of his escaped. In short, the dastardly behaviour of the Regular troops (so-called) exposed those who were inclined to do their duty to almost certain death; and, at length, in spite of every effort to the contrary, broke and ran as sheep before hounds, leaving the artillery, ammunition, provisions, baggage, and in short, everything a prey to the enemy. And when we endeavoured to rally them, in hopes of regaining the ground and what we had left upon it, it was with as little success as if we had attempted to have stopped the wild bears of the mountains, or rivulets with our feet; for they would break by, in despite of every effort that could be made to prevent it."

In another letter George Washington expressed his utter disgust at the debacle, so contrary to the valor and record of the British Regular troops. He wrote:

"It is true, we have been beaten, shamefully beaten, by a handful of men, who only intended to molest and disturb our march. Victory was their smallest expectation. . . had I not been witness to the fact on that fatal day, I should scarce have given credit to it even now."

The British Regulars would have acquitted themselves with credit on a formal battle ground of Europe, but in the wilds of the American forests with Indians fighting from ambush they were helpless and terrified. George Washington had been so ill that on the march he had had to ride in one of the wagons, but was beside General Braddock at the time of the attack. As the other aides had soon been wounded, the carrying of the General's orders fell upon him. In constant danger, two horse were shot from under him, and four bullets went through his clothes. Although reported killed, he attributed his preservation to the all-pwerful dispensations of Providence. Out of 1,373 noncommissioned officers and men, only 453 came off unharmed. Washington, however, underestimated considerably the French and Indian force.

The immediate effect of the defeat of Braddock's forces was disastrous; for Colonel Dunbar, who commanded the rear of Braddock's Army that had not participated in the battle, refused, after receiving the fugitives, to advance or even to stand his ground, but retreated to Fort Cumberland and then decided to place himself and his troops out of reach of such border warfare and withdrew his men to Philadelphia, leaving the entire border at the mercy of the raids of the French and Indians.

This emergency brought forth the convening of the House of Burgesses of the colony of Virginia by Governor Dinwiddie, which voted 40,000 pounds and authorized the raising of a regiment of 1,000 men. The governor gave George Washington a commission as colonel and commander in chief of all of the forces raised in Virginia for the portection of the frontier. This commission was the answer to the general demand for the services of George Washington, whose actions under all emergencies had been and unusual tribute to the qualities of a 23-year-old officer.To him it meant a constant struggle to organize forces for the defense of the border without the necessary means with which to do so. He made sound and practical plans, but was not permitted to get them beyond the beginning of the central Fort Loudoun at Winchester. His own desire was for offensive operations, but he was overruled and forced to abide by the policy of a chain of small fortified posts, so poorly provided with men for their defense that they were helpless to defend their surrounding territory against Indian raids, which were growing steadily in frequency and in atrocity.

In the mind of someone such as Governor Dinwiddie, if there was any doubt about the capability of young Washington, his "myth" would have been punctured quickly. What Ferling cannot and likely will not answer for is the butcher's bill at the end of such battles. The casualty counts cannot be discounted. The willingness of men to follow Washington again and again cannot be discounted. There is a consistent theme throughout Washington's life--he led by example from the front. Washington actually fought in and survived horrific battles that only a self-serving "myth" of a man would have run away from. Instead, Washington placed himself in grave danger and did this time and again during the Revolution.

During the confusion, General Washington rode up to rally Mercer’s men, while a fresh brigade of 2,100 troops under General John Cadwalader arrived with an artillery battery. Washington then rode straight into the British fire, personally leading the attack. As Washington charged towards the British lines, he was heard yelling

“Parade with me my brave fellows, we will have them soon!”

In a remarkable display of courage and leadership, he headed directly toward the British lines, yelling at the soldiers to rally behind him. Surviving intense fire, Washington helped to turn the tide of battle and led his men in pursuit of the fleeing British, crying out, “It’s a fine fox hunt, boys!”

His bravery proven, I have to cite the words of his enemies. If Washington were so cunning and willing to "throw others under the bus," then why does his account ring so true when compared to that of a French officer:

Monsieur de Contrecoeur, captain of infantry commanding at Fort Duquesne, having been informed that the English would march out from Virginia to come to attack him, was warned a little time afterward that they were on the road. He put spies through the country who would inform him faithfully of their route. The 7th of this month (July) he was warned that the army, composed of 3,000 men of the regular English forces were only six leagues from his fort. The commander employed the next day in making his arrangements, and on the 9th of the month he sent Monsieur de Beaujeu against the enemy and gave him for second in command Monsieurs Dumas and de Lignery, all three of them being captains, with four lieutenants, six ensigns, 20 cadets, 100 soldiers, 100 Canadians, and 600 savages, with orders to hide themselves in a favorable place that had previously been reconnoitred. The detachment found itself in the presence of the enemy at three leagues from the fort before being able to gain its appointed post. Monsieur de Beaujeu seeing that his ambuscade had failed, began a direct attack. He did this with so much energy that the enemy, who awaited us in the best order in the world, seemed astounded at the assault. Their artillery, however, promptly commenced to fire and our forces were confused in their turn. The savages also, frightened by the noise of the cannon rather than their execution, commenced to lose ground. Monsieur de Beaujeu was killed, and Monsieur Dumas rallied our forces. He ordered his officers to lead the savages and spread out on both wings, so as to take the enemy in flank. At the same time he, Monsieur de Lignery, and the other officers who were at the head of the French attacked in front. This order was executed so promptly that the enemy, who were already raising cries of victory, were no longer able even to defend themselves. The combat wavered from one side to the other and success was long doubtful, but at length the enemy fled.

They struggled unavailingly to keep some order in their retreat. The cries of the savages with which the woods echoed, carried fear into the hearts of the foe. The rout was complete. The field of battle remained in our possession, with six large cannons and a dozen smaller ones, four bombs, eleven mortars, all their munitions of war and almost all their baggage. Some deserters who have since come to us tell us that we fought against two thousand men, the rest of the army being four leagues farther back. These same deserters tell us that our enemies have retired to Virginia. The spies that we have sent out report that the thousand men who had no part in the battle, also took fright and abandoned their arms and provisions along the road. On this news we sent out a detachment which destroyed or burned all that remained by the roadside.The enemies have lost more than a thousand men on the field of battle; they have lost a great part of their artillery and provisions, also their general, named Monsieur Braddock, and almost all their officers. We had three officers killed and two wounded, two cadets wounded. This remarkable success, which scarcely seemed possible in view of the inequality of the forces, is the fruit of the experience of Monsieur Dumas and of the activity and valor of the officers that he had under his orders.

What's interesting to me is that Washington could very well likely have been made a scapegoat for the whole affair; instead, his reputation as a leader was cemented and his actions rewarded. Washington's "self-serving" account doesn't jibe with reality--others fled, others ordered retreats, men superior in rank to Major Washington issued orders, and the accounts of how the troops fared are backed up by the words of a French officer who opposed the British and provincial forces. Self-serving liars rarely have their accounts of a battle backed up by the account of their enemies.

Not to go shooting past the obvious, but let's also judge Washington's statements about the Regulars, the British Army. He excoriates their conduct and renders a harsh judgement upon them. A self-serving man, given to ambition and lying, would never have said such things in a letter to a government official. Washington was, at the time, a loyal British subject and would have accepted a commission in the Regular British Army without flinching if it would have been commensurate with the rank bestowed upon him by his fellow Virginians. Ferling commits the original sin of phony scholarship--forgetting that the George Washington of the early 1750s held in great esteem his country, which was Britain not America, and he respected and wished to join the British Army, going so far as to accept tutelage from General Braddock to gain military service. Again, where is the self-serving conniver and why did he express disgust at his countrymen in a letter with his superiors? Shouldn't he have flattered himself and his fellow countrymen, blaming everything on French and Indian tricks and subterfuge?

Writers like Ferling operate from the belief that ambition is evil; what they do not acknowledge or clarify for the reader is that, in the context of the times in which the subject lived, ambition was everything. You cannot judge a person of the 1750s by today's standards when it comes to overcoming deficiencies in social and economic standing. That's just ludicrous. The hardest thing to overcome in 1750 was, quite frankly, who one's birth father was. Washington overcame his modest standing and fathered a country by being an ambitious son of a bitch, and for that, we should make no excuses and we should not apply ridiculous standards. Sadly, there are just enough people who will lap this up and compare Washington to George W. Bush and will have their own ignorance confirmed.

Ferling's next book should be about the caveman who discovered fire; I'm certain that there is just enough phony scholarship out there that will illustrate just what a conniving bastard he was.