An American Lion

This is enough to frustrate you and break your heart at the same time:

Jonathan’s chain of command had deemed the village critical to accomplishing U.S. counterinsurgency objectives. Given the terrain, and the heavy concentration of insurgents in the Waygal Valley, a company- or battalion-size force was needed. But Jonathan was given only additional weapons and a small contingent of Afghan National Army soldiers who were not well trained. During his five days there, he reported increasing enemy forces observing his location and a critical lack of defensive matériel, concerns that were met with indifference by his superiors. An Afghan construction firm that was key to the success of the outpost endeavor didn’t think the drive was safe to make. Jonathan’s platoon ran low on water while trying to work in 100-degree heat; their ability to dig and complete fighting positions was compromised. A Predator surveillance drone covering Jon’s platoon was redirected on day two.

I talked to my son at length during his midtour break two months before the battle of Wanat. I was concerned that his unit had never received the appropriate cultural and environmental training before deploying (trained for operations in Iraq, Jonathan’s 173rd Airborne Brigade was sent to Afghanistan at the last minute). One night he showed me combat videos; one was of an airstrike on an insurgent who was occupying a house, holding a family hostage. The attack destroyed the home—and damaged others nearby. I told Jonathan that he had just lost the village. But he told me that I didn’t get it.

Jonathan’s unit had a steep learning curve—Afghanistan is much more complex and dangerous than Iraq. He explained that there was minimal constructive engagement with the local population. His battalion was grossly overextended, causing his platoon to be often put in isolated, high-risk situations. In many cases, there were no Special Forces or Provincial Reconstruction Teams to aid in working with local Afghans. In some instances, he operated without critical air or artillery support. Other efforts were marred by “kinetic diplomacy,” which just antagonized the population. Trying to win hearts and minds is the right thing to do, but it’s impossible without the required training and appropriate resources once troops are on the ground.

I’m not adding my usual spiel to this. I will say that Mr. Brostrom is much wiser than any general leading our troops right now, that’s for certain.