An American Lion

A little British Army imagery for you…

I realize that this comes from the British media, but it refers to something of which that the American people have little or no understanding:

A key adviser to Nato forces warned today that Barack Obama risks a Suez-style debacle in Afghanistan if he fails to deploy enough extra troops and opts instead for a messy compromise.

David Kilcullen, one of the world’s leading authorities on counter-insurgency and an adviser to the British government as well as the US state department, said Obama’s delay in reaching a decision over extra troops had been “messy”. He said it not only worried US allies but created uncertainty the Taliban could exploit.

Speaking in an interview with the Guardian, he compared the president to someone “pontificating” over whether to send enough firefighters into a burning building to put a fire out.

He was speaking as Obama left Washington for a nine-day trip to Asia without announcing a decision on troop numbers. The options being considered by the US have been narrowed down to four: sending 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 or 40,000, the latter the figure requested by the Nato commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal. These would be on top of 68,000 US troops already deployed.

The deep divisions with the Obama administrationwere exposed yesterday by leaked diplomatic cables from the US ambassador in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, who urged Obama to ignore McChrystal’s request unless the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, cleaned up his corrupt government.

Kilcullen expressed concern that Obama might deny McChrystal the 40,000 extra troops and split the difference between the four options, the kind of fudge common in domestic politics.

Deep divisions? No. Political shenanigans? Yes. Leaks, moves, maneuvers, and intrigue. Thanks for bringing change to the process, Obama Administration. Thanks for not making politics the only consideration here. That shows tremendous leadership.

The example of the Suez crisis (1956) is not really that pertinent, and nobody in this country has more than a passing knowledge of it. I’m sure you’ll hear the TV pundits mention Suez, but only afterthey go to Wikipedia. An enterprising young fellow should update the Suez Crisis Wiki page, to include how using icebreakers and cruise ships saved the day by bringing in Polish brides for the disgruntled Egyptian military forces.

What began as a dispute between Egypt and Israel quickly grew to involve the British because of the seizure of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians. There were too many players involved in 1956, to include the French and the Soviets. Our situation in Afghanistan is really not that complex—we are propping up a kleptocracy while hundreds of different warlords and factions (wrongfully lumped into one big “Taliban”) intrigue against one another and destabilize Pakistan and parts of Iran so that the entire region can tie down the United States and NATO. This is defeat by meatgrinder, and all anyone has to do to lose is to keep feeding meat into a device that our enemies aren’t ever going to stop turning. President Obama is in over his head and refuses to understand how the sausage is getting made. We are well past the point to pull out our troops, fire the generals, and abandon the failed policies of a neoconservative movement that has been universally discredited.

Margaret Thatcher expresses the lessons learned as aptly as anyone: (Margaret Thatcher) The Path of Power (1995)

The balance of interest and principle in the Suez affair is not a simple one. I had no qualms about Britain’s right to respond to Nasser’s illegal seizure of an international waterway - if only action had been taken quickly and decisively. Over the summer, however, we were outmanoeuvred by a clever dictator into a position where our interests could only be protected by bending our legal principles. Among the many reasons for criticizing the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion is that it was bound to tarnish our case when it became known, as it assuredly would and did. At the same time, Suez was the last occasion when the European powers might have withstood and brought down a Third World dictator who had shown no interest in international agreements, except where he could profit from them. Nasser’s victory at Suez had among its fruits the overthrow of the pro-Western regime in Iraq, the Egyptian occupation of the Yemen, and the encirclement of Israel which led to the Six Day War - and the bills were still coming in when I left office.

As I came to know more about it, I drew four lessons from this sad episode. First, we should not -get into a military operation unless we were determined and able to finish it. Second, we should never again find ourselves on the opposite side to the United States in a major international crisis affecting Britain’s interests. Third, we should ensure that our actions were in accord with international law. And finally, he who hesitates is lost.

Well, we have hesitated, and we have dithered, and now we’re approaching a ‘half-assing’ of the situation that won’t solve anything. We know we can’t kill our way to victory. How about we try letting the diplomats solve the problem? Give them money, give them some leeway, and let’s see what they come up with?

How about we just agree that we’ve no real strategic interests in Afghanistan or in Iraq and just leave? Do either possess the means to threaten the United States? No. Let’s let politics and money have a go at solving these problems